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REMARKS
CORPORATE LAW PROFESSORS AS
GATEKEEPERS
LYMAN JOHNSON*
Like Professor Rakesh Khurana, I will address the critical role of grad-
uate and professional education in shaping beliefs about corporate purpose
and healthy corporate activity. But I will discuss law school education; spe-
cifically, I contend that what corporate law professors do (and do not) teach
may contribute to a faulty outlook on certain baseline issues in the minds of
future lawyers who advise corporate directors and officers. Wrongheaded
ideas picked up in law school can critically shape how lawyers discharge
their all-important role as legal counselors to business people. In the current
business environment—where trust is in short supply—we legal educators
must ask ourselves whether we are doing all we can to instill right thinking
and right conduct in those who will counsel key decision-makers in the
corporate setting.
First, I share two striking statistics: fifty-six percent of MBA students
admitted in a recent survey that they had cheated at least once in the prior
year,1 and forty-five percent of law students reported that they had done
so.2 Evidently, something is wrong in the educational culture as well as in
the business and professional cultures into which we send our students. Law
school is the “gate” through which students must pass if they wish to be-
come lawyers. Consequently, we who teach them are “gatekeepers” into the
profession. Likewise, those of us who teach corporate law are the gatekeep-
ers into a corporate law practice, and we must be mindful of the social role
entrusted to us and must endeavor to discharge that role responsibly.
Graduate education, in the business law area as elsewhere, can broaden
(or narrow) a student’s intellectual and ethical horizons.3 Corporate law,
* LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneap-
olis); Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. Lucia Graves, Which Types of Students Cheat Most?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 3,
2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/2008/10/03/which-types-of-students-cheat-most.
html (citing research by Professor Donald McCabe).
2. Id.
3. As James Hunter has observed, “Language itself provides horizons for our moral imagi-
nations.” JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, THE DEATH OF CHARACTER 24 (2000).
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like other disciplines, asks certain questions and does not ask others. In
other words, it begins with a paradigm and that paradigm frames the ensu-
ing inquiry by including and excluding certain topics. Students quickly pick
up what we think matters, both by what we professors discuss and highlight
and—equally powerfully—by what we do not discuss and thereby ignore.
There are many facets to our role as educational gatekeepers, but I will
highlight just a couple of them.
Beginning about twenty-five years ago—and for a variety of reasons,
not the least of which was the dramatic upsurge of wide-scale hostile take-
over activity4—two related, discipline-shaping phenomena took hold in cor-
porate law scholarship and corporate law teaching. These paradigm-shifting
developments were imported from graduate business schools and econom-
ics departments. First, the role of markets in disciplining corporate directors
and officers was heavily emphasized.5 The influence of these markets, of
course, included the usual competitive pressures found in relevant product
and services markets. Other markets, though, also were emphasized.6 With
respect to the market for executive talent, for example, it was argued that
the desire to land a better job and to move up the corporate ladder would
motivate managers to perform well, deliver value, and thereby win plaudits
and advance their careers.7
The capital markets were also said to be severe disciplinarians in at
least two ways.8 First, to successfully access equity markets, a company had
to have a compelling, credible story to tell prospective investors. Recent
evidence, however, suggests that internal cash flows and debt may be more
significant sources of funds than equity, at least for many firms.9 Second,
once traded on a public market, the share price of a company’s common
stock was said to be a shorthand report card on management—a low share
price supposedly indicated managerial shortcomings that would make a
company vulnerable to an outside bid by an investor (or “raider,” to use the
pejorative parlance of the day) who would pay current shareholders a pre-
mium to gain a controlling interest and then, in theory, spiff up the com-
pany and run it in such a way as to produce wealth for the new owners.10
Reality did not always match theory, however, as many companies faltered
4. See Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and
Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 867–78 (1990) (describing responses to takeover activity in
the 1980s).
5. See Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2223 (1992).
6. Id.
7. See generally Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate
Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (2002).
8. See Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841 (1981).
9. Lawrence Mitchell, The Legitimate Interests of Public Shareholders, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009).
10. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 841–42.
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or outright collapsed under the burdensome debt financing often used to
fund an acquisition.
This broad embracing of market solutions to corporate activity was, at
bottom, an argument for a libertarian, deregulatory policy approach to busi-
ness matters, generally, and to corporate law and securities regulation, spe-
cifically.11 If markets worked as efficiently as theorized, the oversight role
of courts and other corporate regulators could, it was argued, be reduced
and the possibility of regulatory error curtailed.12 Harmonious markets
would also supposedly lead to the overall well-being of both shareholders
and society at large. If markets sometimes fail, however, as Professor Cof-
fee argues was the case in the subprime market meltdown, then a deregu-
latory stance is far harder to justify. We probably witnessed the high water
mark of this outlook in early 2007 when private equity funds and hedge
funds still reigned supreme. This likely is not what the U.S. or global finan-
cial and corporate world will look like for the next few years.13 Corporate
law, as a field of study, will not merely be a sub-category of contract law or
economics.
The second ground-shifting phenomenon that took hold in corporate
law over the last quarter century was wide-scale adoption of a shareholder
primacy conception of corporate purpose.14 Within law schools, although
there were a few dissenters and some variations on the theme,15 it was
widely assumed (that is, it was not discussed in class or at academic confer-
ences) that the overall purpose of corporate activity was, of course, singu-
larly to maximize shareholder wealth. The corporation was simplistically
regarded as a financing vehicle or a “nexus of contracts;”16 any sense of the
corporation as an important social institution wielding vast influence on
countless lives was marginalized or lost altogether.17 In this regard, what
happened in corporate law education since the 1980s resembles the devel-
opments in graduate business education outlined by Professor Khurana. Ed-
ucators who are not careful will wrongly convey, in law schools as in
business schools, that business activity has one chief and undisputed end:
make as much money as possible. Instilling that belief in young law stu-
dents can lead them, like students in graduate business schools, to think that
they too should act so as to maximize their own financial position. In this
11. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 2237–40.
12. Id.
13. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSY-
CHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 167–76
(2009).
14. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 878–88.
15. Symposium, New Directions in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993).
16. Johnson, supra note 5, at 2215–16, 2219–22 (describing this view, popularized by Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel in corporate law but imported wholesale from financial
economics).
17. Id. at 2226–29 (describing the more organic, institutional view of sociologist Robert
Bellah).
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way, what supposedly is intended as a descriptive account of institutional
and individual goals can be wrongly understood as a prescriptive endorse-
ment of self-serving conduct. Calls for adherence to notions of “profession-
alism” and the supposed steadying influence of professional rules may
prove to be weak counterforces to a rampant wealth-primacy norm in the
cultures of business and business-advising to which our students are
heading.
Shareholder primacy as a normative goal was embraced as canonical
in corporate law;18 the scholarly debate was not over ends, it was over
means. I could say several things about this, but my overall point is this:
there are widespread misunderstandings in the business world—as well as
in business education and in legal education—with respect to what the law
does (and does not) require on the question of corporate purpose. In short,
outside unusual circumstances—the so-called “Revlon” mode under Dela-
ware law19—no law requires that businesses pursue only the goal of corpo-
rate profit or the goal of investor wealth maximization.20 As with other
myths, this one dies hard, but it remains as legally mythical as tales of Jack
Frost or Paul Bunyan. Lawyers and law students who do not properly ap-
preciate this point may wrongly believe that factors other than wealth max-
imization cannot, and therefore should not, be considered in charting
corporate strategy. Heedless wealth maximization, at the expense of pru-
dence, played a key role in recent financial problems. The public’s continu-
ing perception that businesses have wrongly pressed to maximize profits at
the expense of other considerations is impeding the restoration of trust in
the business sector.
Although various markets certainly constrain managerial discretion to
varying degrees in the relevant industry, and although shareholders have
voting rights and could oust boards they consider to be too socially or mor-
ally responsible,21 the widespread pursuit of shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion as a corporate objective largely stems not from law but from social
norms and business lore that can powerfully influence managerial belief
and conduct. There are, to be sure, normative and policy arguments sup-
porting—and disfavoring—this convention,22 but there is no legal obliga-
18. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563 (2003).
19. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The
degree of judicial scrutiny brought to bear on whether and how directors actually discharge their
Revlon duties was substantially reduced in the recent case of Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, No.
401-2008, 2009 WL 1024764 (Del. Mar. 25, 2009).
20. This theme is more fully developed in Lyman Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers in
Educating (Christian) Business Managers About Corporate Purpose (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of
Law Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1260979.
21. Id.
22. Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1189 (2002).
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tion to follow it. Certainly, shareholder primacy outside Revlon is not a
judicial standard of review for assessing director or officer behavior when
challenged in court. In fact, were this not true, the ongoing normative de-
bates about corporate social responsibility and business ethics would be
meaningless: in ethical discourse, a moral “ought” necessarily implies
“can.” Only if they genuinely possess legal latitude can we meaningfully
discuss what managers “should” and should not do in various business set-
tings. Nor is there a historically or culturally immutable or “fixed” position
on this basic matter of corporate purpose. Rather, a study of our own coun-
try’s history reveals that beliefs as to appropriate corporate goals can
change over time. Moreover, they can vary from country to country and
even from company to company. There is, consequently, no a priori reason
for insisting on a corporate monism in which all companies pursue the same
ultimate goal, as opposed to a more institutionally pluralistic approach
whereby businesses vary in the degree to which they single-mindedly pur-
sue investor wealth. We should not mislead students by teaching them
otherwise.
Probably the most famous assertion as to the proper purpose of busi-
ness activity came from renowned economist Milton Friedman. He stated as
follows:
A corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the busi-
ness. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsi-
bility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires,
which generally will be to make as much money as possible while
conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in
law and those embodied in ethical custom.23
Friedman cites no positive law authority for his position. His is strictly
a normative position that, as noted earlier, is nowhere mandated. In fact,
many positive law authorities permit a contrary view.24 Friedman’s posi-
tion, moreover, when closely examined proves to be quite tolerant of so-
cially-responsible conduct under certain conditions. He suggests acting in
accordance with shareholder desires. Today, different segments of investors
appear to have some appetite for responsible conduct, and not simply a
desire to make as much money as quickly as possible.25 This represents a
market solution to the issue of corporate purpose, of the kind Friedman, as a
free market advocate, would seem to support. Indeed, he qualifies his ad-
monition to maximize profits by using the word “generally,”26 thereby rec-
ognizing that certain investors likely will have different preferences. In fact,
23. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32.
24. See Johnson, supra note 20.
25. Einer Elhange, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 779–91 (2005).
26. Friedman, supra note 23.
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the very next (and little-quoted) sentence following the popular Friedman
quotation noted above goes on to capture just this point: “Of course, in
some cases his employers may have different objectives.”27 This recog-
nizes, as well, that human motivation is more complex than neo-classical
economics theory posits; many people, perhaps most, at least occasionally
sacrifice their own maximum well-being for the good of others.
Moreover, Friedman recognizes that executives must also conform not
only to the law but also to rules “embodied in ethical custom.”28 As ethical
principles evolve in a society—whether they be greater attentiveness to en-
vironmental concerns, employee job security and benefits, product safety,
or other considerations, such as better risk management—executives, in
Friedman’s view, must conform to them. Business practices in a democ-
racy—like law itself—eventually must reflect underlying social norms and,
as with other customs, those practices may change. In 2009 we may be
entering a period of fundamental rethinking as to society’s expectations of
for-profit businesses. We should invite our students to reflect on and dis-
cuss these baseline issues in our corporate law classes. Those students will
be key participants in shaping business behavior in the private sector, and
perhaps in the public sector, in the years ahead.
The simple point for corporate law professors in law schools, then, is
this: We have a responsibility to help our students, who are training to be
business lawyers, understand what the law does (and does not) really say
about corporate purpose and what new scholarly work has to say about
human motivation that challenges the simplistic self-interest view of neo-
classical economics,29 and we should identify for them the host of factors
shaping current thinking about these key subjects. Only then can they be
best-positioned to have both a broad understanding of the corporation’s le-
gal and social role, and to provide genuinely sound counsel to future cli-
ents. One reason to be optimistic that corporate law professors once again
are starting to realize the enduring value of examining corporate purpose is
seen in the American Association of Law School’s 2009 Mid-Year Meeting
on Business Associations. A plenary session is titled “What Are the Objec-
tives of Public Companies and Who Decides?”30 That is a great and time-
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Several articles in a recent collection of works develop this theme in various ways. See,
e.g., Robert C. Solomon, Free Enterprise, Sympathy, and Virtue, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITI-
CAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 16, 17, 34 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008); Peter J. Richerson &
Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Free Enterprise Values, in MORAL MARKETS, supra, at 107, 111,
118 (describing a “moral hidden hand” inducing cooperation among humans); Lynn A. Stout,
Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS, supra, at 157; Herbert Gintis & Rakesh
Khurana, Corporate Honesty and Business Education, in MORAL MARKETS, supra, at 300,
304–06.
30. Conference on Business Associations: Taking Stock of the Field and Corporate Social
Accountability, http://www.aals.org/midyear2009/ (last visited May 22, 2009).
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less question—notwithstanding those in corporate law who sought in recent
years to marginalize this vital query—and one we should also pose to our
students before they pass through the law school “gate.”
